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The intriguing recent suggestion of Tegmark that the universe—contrary to
all our experiences and expectations—contains only a small amount of infor-
mation due to an extremely high degree of internal symmetry is critically
examined. It is shown that there are several physical processes, notably
Hawking evaporation of black holes and non-zero decoherence time effects
described by Plaga, as well as thought experiments of Deutsch and Tegmark
himself, which can be construed as arguments against the low-information
universe hypothesis. Some ramifications for both quantum mechanics and
cosmology are briefly discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION: LIU HYPOTHESIS
1.1. The quantity of information present in our universe and its trans-
fer has been an intriguing issue in theoretical cosmology ever since pi-
oneering studies of Rindler(1) and Metzner and Morrison.(2) In 1970-ies
and early 1980-ies it has gained a new momentum after seminal results
of Bekenstein(3) and Hawking(4) on the intricate relationship between infor-
mation, thermodynamics and gravitation. Finally, during the last decade
several new moments and motivations have been put forward. Treumann
has explicated the usage of information-theoretical methods in cosmology
and demonstrated the crucial role of inflation in bringing about observed
information richness of the present universe.(5) The great advances in the
nascent discipline of physical eschatology(6) motivated investigations into
possibilities of future information processing, tightly connected with the is-
sue of future survival of intelligent observers.(7) In addition, from the point
of view of both classical and quantum information theory, as well as general
computer science, this link between quantum mechanics and cosmology is
highly interesting.(8,9,10) Therefore, it seems that applications of informa-
tion theory and theory of complexity in cosmology has gradually reached
mature methodological state. In addition, the explosive growth of computer
science and industry in recent years has stimulated many interesting discus-
sions on the possibility of large-scale simulations of human sensory inputs
and natural surroundings.(11)
1.2. In this vein, by far the most far-reaching and provocative hypoth-
esis has been put forward by Tegmark,(12) which we shall call the low-
information universe (henceforth LIU) picture. Tegmark’s paper is rich and
fascinating reading, many ideas of which are rather difficult to convey in a
review manner. In brief, the main idea relies on conjuction of the Everett’s
”no-collapse” quantum theory and properties of temporal evolution of non-
linear systems. According to the ”no-collapse” theory, all components of the
linear superposition of the universal wave function exist simultaneously.(13)
This view, coupled with our understanding of the structure formation in
the universe and non-linear amplification of small perturbations, gives rise
to the following thought-provoking picture. Initially very simple (= of low
information content) universe evolves in such way that the quantity of al-
gorithmic information present in it is constant throughout the cosmological
evolution. Therefore, the total amount of algorithmic information remains
at the same low level as it was at the beginning of structure formation pro-
cesses. However, due to the constant symmetry breaking realized through
branching of Everett’s wavefunction components, apparent complexity in-
creases without limits, since only one component of the ”grand superpo-
sition” is accessible to any inside observer (the latter fact is explained by
quantum mechanical decoherence). In Tegmark’s words, ”The net result is
that although the wavefunction of the universe contains almost no algorith-
mic information (we can specify it by simply giving the initial wave function
and the Hamiltonian), and will retain for instance translational and rota-
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tional symmetry from the initial data, we will experience an asymmetric
universe that appears extremely complex.”
1.3. It is important to understand that Tegmark’s hypothesis is a new
physical theory, and not just an ”interpretation” or a ”view”. Not only does
it tell us something new (and very unorthodox) about the nature of the
physical reality, but it makes several distinct and well-defined predictions
which could ultimately be falsified. We shall consider some of these physical
predictions below. Although it is not possible to falsify any of them at
the present moment, we claim that simultaneous satisfaction of different
empirical constraints makes the theory less probable. In any case, we ought
to avoid the trap (partially of semantic nature) which is easy to fall into, as
testified by the example of Everett’s multiverse theory, to claim that LIU is
just another ”interpretation” of the same underlying theory, which can not
be meaningfully discriminated from other such ”interpretations”.1
1.4. Having this in mind, in the further course of this essay we shall try
to elaborate and defend the following four theses:
(A) LIU does not preclude the existence of definite quantity of the
apparent information in our universe. The latter is still interesting quantity
for physics.
(B) LIU relies on the idealization of complete separation of multiverse
branches, or zero decoherence time. However, the effect recently proposed
for experimental verification by Plaga may obviate this assumption. Even
more remote verification proposals, like those of Deutsch, Page and Tegmark
conceptually jeopardize the theory.
(C) The well-known possibility of solving the information loss paradox
in black hole evaporation by fundamental non-unitarity (Hawking’s idea) is
incompatible with LIU.
(D) Intelligent observers can not create any new information beyond the
pre-existent linear superposition. Therefore, LIU entails an extreme version
of physical reductionism.
1.5. One thing should be kept in mind: LIU hypothesis cannot be
brought down by ”frontal assault”, i.e. through finding some empirical phe-
nomena whose complexity is so high that they cannot be incorporated in
LIU scheme. The reason is obvious enough, as Tegmark points out: any
such phenomenon would be a local one, and its complicated description is
subsumed in the overall symmetry. (In the same manner as any one partic-
ular book in Borges’ ”Library of Babel”—having a very long description—is
subsumed by a simple general rule, like ”All combinations of letters of the
specified (book) length actually exist in the Library.”(37)) Thus we shall
concentrate upon those aspects of the physical mechanism envisaged by
Tegmark, like linearity or unitarity, on which the process of subsuming de-
1There is a slowly building consensus that the Everett’s ”no-collapse” view is a sepa-
rate theory, not just an interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism.(14,15,16,17)
Some of the (still thought) experiments discriminating between Everett’s theory and the
orthodox quantum mechanics are described by Deutsch(18) and Plaga.(19) More on this
in Section 3.2. below.
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pends. In addition, we shall reflect upon issues, like epistemic status of the
apparent information or reductionism, which may not have cosmological rel-
evance, but may impact our manner of doing physics if the LIU hypothesis
is a correct description of reality.
1.6. Our discussion intends to show that, with no further empirical
information available, the probability of LIU being the true description of
reality is significantly diminished by these additional considerations.
2. SPEAKABLE AND UNSPEAKABLE IN THE
COSMOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
2.1. One of the main merits of Tegmark’s paper is its conceptual clarity.
The author emphasizes: ”We have argued that although the universe ap-
pears to contain an enormous, perhaps even infinite, amount of information,
this impression is nonetheless consistent with the assumption that its algo-
rithmic information content is quite small, even if no new physics whatsoever
is invoked. In short, reality could in fact be much simpler than it appears,
with its apparent plethora or complex structures such as trees, fountains
and rabbits Thus even if both the laws of physics and the initial conditions
exhibit so much symmetry that they are easy to describe, we would not
expect most of these symmetries to be manifested in what we see when we
open our eyes.” (Ref. 12, p. 36). However, the true issue is whether science
in general and physics in particular deals with algorithmic or only apparent
information. (We shall call the information actually perceived in any single
slice of the Everett’s multiverse the apparent information, in accordance
with Tegmark’s terminology. It is obviously a complementary concept to
the algorithmic information, as used by Tegmark and other authors.) It is,
unfortunately, well known that there is a recognized vagueness regarding the
exact meaning and proper usage of the concept of information, resulting in
some authors even calling the usage of this term ”vulgar”.(20) In the present
study, we claim that only apparent information is physically relevant quan-
tity (although this does not warrant that it is well defined in all conceivable
physical contexts!). In other words, it is the only ”speakable” issue in the
physical world, in contradistinction to the Platonic world of mathematical
objects (to borrow a picture from Penrose, Ref. 21). One of the difficulties
with the LIU concept is that it subtly shifts grounds between the physical
world and the abstract mathematical description; this is partly responsible
for shocking effect of its main idea.
2.2. When we talk about apparent informational content of any one
particular slice in the universal superposition, we should note that it is not
a completely exact physical concept, since no empirical data really pertain to
a single well-defined slice, due to the continuous branching of the universal
wavefunction. Thus, any set of data describes not a single slice, but a family
of what we can call close slices, i.e. those produced by ”recent” and ”local”
measurement-like interactions. In spite of this rather technical difficulty,
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one may argue that empirical data and theoretical models pertaining to
the informational content of the apparent universe (such as the results of
Treumann(5)) are good approximations to the informational content of a
single component of the universal superposition. Since natural laws are
valid in any one single branch of the multiverse, its informational content
evolves according to the expectations for the complex systems dominated
by long-range forces, mainly gravity.
2.3. One may conclude that even on the face of LIU hypothesis, cos-
mological evolution (a single history or small set of close histories) is an
entirely tractable problem of interest for cosmologists. Methods, such as
those used by Treumann,(5) and general application of approximations such
as Bekenstein-Hawking formula for entropy of gravitating systems (e.g. Ref.
21), are part of the ”speakable” reality even if the totality of everything
that exists is trivially simple.
2.4. In a sense, this issue has been recognized by Tegmark, as may be
inferred from his locutions, such as ”that only macroscopically ’classical’
states could be perceived by self-aware subsets of the universe (such as us)”
in which he talks about observers. It has been left unsaid, but it is an obvi-
ous consequence of LIU that out of all branches of the universal wavefunction
we may expect most of them to be empty as far as observers (”self-aware
elements”) are concerned. In particular, the process of nonlinear structure
formation is essentially fine-tuned in order to produce galaxies (and conse-
quently stars, planets, etc.) since the spectrum of primordial perturbations
might as well produce conditions in which either there is no decoupling of
initial overdensities from the Hubble flow, or the amplitude of perturbations
is so high that matter ends up predominantly in supermassive black holes.
In all these cases, there would be no conditions for development of life and
subsequently, self-awareness. This anthropic selection effect related to the
degree of symmetry in initial conditions for structure formation has been
considered long ago by many authors.(15,21,22,23) Thus, even the complete
preservation of the grand symmetry with nonlinear evolution apparently
violates the principle of sufficient reason by introducing an epistemologi-
cal asymmetry through emergence of only a small subset of the universal
wavefunction components containing observers. In other words, the distri-
bution of the apparent complexity will nevertheless be wildly non-uniform
(in spite of what could be prima facie expected in case of such an extreme
symmetry). This tendency is unidirectional in cosmic time.2
2.5. Finally, some would argue that this issue is mainly a semantical
one. This is false, since the question ”Which type of information is data X-
Y-Z that some observer perceives?” is substantially different from-and in a
sense subordinate to-the question ”Which type of information the observer
may sensibly talk about (as perceived or not)?” The latter question is only
implicitly treated in Tegmark’s paper, but it is an important complement
2The same circumstance goes some steps toward mitigating
Tegmark’s (pseudo)Copernican suggestion that the LIU hypothesis is somehow further
diminishing humanity’s place in the universe; more on this below.
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to the issues raised in that study.
3. ISOLATION OR DESOLATION?
3.1. Tegmark’s idea crucially depends on separate Everett’s branches be-
ing completely and absolutely sealed off at all times.3 It is easy to un-
derstand qualitatively why this is so: an enormous amount of algorithmic
information could be encoded in cross-correlation terms (expressing post-
interaction correlations between different components in the global super-
position). It is much more difficult to give a quantitative estimate of the
magnitude of this effect, especially since it strongly depends on the chosen
theory of measurement. Thus, one of the predictions of LIU hypothesis is
that-within what one may call the many-world paradigm-any theories of dy-
namical state reduction, similar to the ones developed by Ghirardi, Rimini
and Weber(24) or Dio`si(25) within the single-world context, which include
nonlinear terms in the Schro¨dinger’s equation, will be unavoidably falsified
by experiments. This may apply, for instance, to the toy model of non-
linear quantum theory suggested by Weinberg(26) in order to test validity
of the EPR-type experiments. As explained by Polchinski,(27) Weinberg’s
model leads to what he has dubbed ”Everett phone,” i.e. the possibility of
inter-world communication (see other instances below). Any such theory,
however, would be rather contrived by definition, since, as Tegmark him-
self explains, the mechanism of environmental decoherence is sufficient for
”simulation” of any measurement-like effects observed so far. Potentially,
one may expect that in the course of further development of such theories,
the extra amount of information coded in these non-linear terms could be
exactly calculated, which will show whether there are any versions of such
theories compatible with the LIU hypothesis. In absence of such calcula-
tions, the LIU requirement does seem a stringent constraint. This occurs
notwithstanding the somewhat strange nature of the argument, reminscent
of Hoyle-Narlikar cosmological model of 1960-ies and 1970-ies, arguing the
necessity of changes in local microphysics on the basis of special cosmolog-
ical boundary conditions required.(28) On the other hand, this prediction
demonstrates again that the LIU hypothesis is not an arbitrary ”interpre-
tation”, but a legitimate and testable physical theory.
3.2. Similarly, any conceivable situation in which communication with
other branches can be established is detrimental to the LIU hypothesis.
This applies, among other instances, to the experiment recently suggested
by Plaga,(19) as well as the older thought-experiment of Deutsch.(18) In the
first case, Plaga introduces a ”gateway state” between the two hypothet-
ical worlds created as the outcome of a conventional photon polarization
measurement. The gateway is a microscopic part of the apparatus which
3For the sake of definiteness, we may take a single branch as the referent one, and
state that at any instant of time measured by the ideal clock in that particular branch,
off-diagonal terms in the density matrix are zero.
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is isolated sufficiently, so that its decoherence timescale is long, and thus
it ”sees” the global superposition long enough to be influenced by it. In
a detailed technical account, Plaga suggests that sufficiently isolated ions
in electromagnetic traps can be used as indicators of such influences, if the
experimental setup is ingenious enough, and the instruction given to ex-
perimenters can be carried out with sufficient precision. In the Deutsch’s
Gedankenexperiment, after two histories decohere in a conventional manner,
they are re-cohered by a convenient and ingenious manipulation of the rele-
vant Hamiltonians in post-measurement time. In Deutsch’s own words, the
net result of the experiment is an anomalous lack of correlation (if Everett is
right and there is no wavefunction collapse): ”The interference phenomenon
seen by our observer at the end of the experiment requires the presence of
the both spin values, though he accurately remembers having known at a
previous time that only one of them was present. He must infer that there
was more than one copy of himself (and the atom) in existence at that time,
and that these copies merged to form his present self.” (Ref. 18, p. 37) The
difference between these two examples is that, while Plaga’s experiment
considers immediate post-measurement interaction of the two wavefunction
branches through a gateway state (in fact, it is crucial for the claimed feasi-
bility of this experiment to have an extremely fast measurement procedure),
the one of Deutsch deals with post-measurement interaction after an arbi-
trarily long time. The price payed for the latter advantage is ”only” the
necessity of having an operational quantum computer capable of simulat-
ing human-level intelligence.4 Thus, the Deutsch experiment belongs to
not-so-near future as far as technology is concerned, but it is conceptually
important, since it shows demonstrable difference between ”collapse” and
”no-collapse” versions of quantum mechanics. A fortiori, LIU is a testable
scientific hypothesis, as already argued above. In addition, it enables us
to-at least in principle-experimentally test the very nature of information
science is dealing with, no mean achievement by any set of standards.
3.3. If one feels, with Polchinski,(27) that ”communication between
branches of the wave function seems even more bizarre than faster-than-light
communication and consequent loss of Lorentz invariance”,5 one may invoke
4As far as the no-collapse view is concerned, the nature of the computer is in fact irrel-
evant, since it presupposes quantum mechanics as ”the universal theory” (the very title
of Deutsch’s article), and therefore any working computer is already part of the quantum
world. If we stick to somewhat more cautious epistemological stance, we should empha-
size that the observer in this thought experiment must be quantum in nature, and it is
crucial that the Hamiltonian expressing his/her internal ”self-interaction(s)” is known. In
principle, the advances in biophysics might bring about the complete knowledge of micro-
scopic processes within a biological observer (like human brain), as well as the relevant
technology to modify such processes in order to intentionally induce necessary changes in
the internal Hamiltonian. (Among various other features, this thought experiment thus
clearly demonstrates ontological realism inherent in Everett’s theory.) However, it seems
more realistic that this degree of knowledge and manipulative powers will be reached by
a human-made quantum computer.
5”...but it is not clear that it represents an actual inconsistency.” (Ref. 27, p. 399).
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the quantum suicide (thought?) experiment proposed by Tegmark.(16) In
this scenario, a quantum measurement results in firing of the gun pointed
to the head of the experimenter if one particular value of, for instance, spin
z-projection of a fermion is measured, and in harmless ”click” of the gun
at the other outcome. Notice that only physical collapse—as in the ”ortho-
dox” Copenhagen interpretation or the dynamical reduction theories—is
actually harmful from the experimenter’s point of view. Since in the ”no-
collapse” view there is no actual collapse, just fast decoherence between the
branches, experimenter will find herself in the strange situation of impossi-
bility of committing suicide, although the gun is loaded and fully functional!
This is different from the ”outsider” view of, say, assistant in the experi-
ment, who will perceive the bloody deed after at most several repetitions of
the experiment (being in one of the decohered branches). This experiment
may indirectly support the LIU hypothesis by showing that the quantum
mechanical collapse does not happen. However, it remains an open and
difficult epistemological issue whether this ”I-know-but-cannot-tell” type of
experiment may discriminate between various theories. A contrary opinion
may be heard, based on the statement that the question ”what will you
perceive” is not a well-defined question in a quantum mechanical context
(Prof. Ken Olum, private communication). We cannot enter into discussion
of this issue here.
3.4. There may be a loophole left to Tegmark to defend the LIU the-
ory in the following form. Even if the evolution of quantum mechanical
systems is fundamentally nonlinear, one may expect the algorithmic infor-
mation content of the multiverse density matrix today would be almost the
same as for the initial one as long as the equation governing its evolution is
deterministic. And determinism is invoked here in its ”strongest” form, i.e.
similar to the Laplacian case: one neglects the apparent ”indeterminism”
resulting from observer’s subjective incapacity of perceiving the entire pic-
ture. Whether we should expect possible nonlinear terms in the Schro¨dinger
evolution to be deterministic or stochastic, remains a fully open question.
The already mentioned Ghirardi et al. theory(24) has been argued to be in-
trinsically indeterministic.(29) However, one thing is clear: the determinism
necessary for LIU to work is—in the field of philosophy of time—compatible
only with B-theories of time (no temporal becoming). Whether B-theories
are superior to A-theories (entailing reality of temporal becoming), or even
tenable is an age-old problem not being solved to this day. Recently, how-
ever, Elitzur and Dolev(30) have forcefully argued—contrary to the prevail-
ing opinion so far—that A-theories are actually closer to the physical ideas,
as far as quantum gravitational effects are concerned. This leads us directly
to the substance of the thesis (C).
4. LOSS OF INFORMATION = LOSS OF SIMPLICITY
4.1. The algorithmic information once present in the universe does not
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change during the amplification of small perturbations in the highly sym-
metric reality as envisaged by LIU. Conventionally, one tends to see this as
a counterargument to the idea of information growth in the course of the
cosmological evolution. However, the idea that the amount of algorithmic
information may be irretrievably lost in the course of evolution of a physi-
cal system is equally antithetical to LIU. Any form of non-conservation of
information cannot be accomodated in the LIU framework. Of course, the
information loss must be fundamental, not just apparent from the human
point of view; the stock example of waves erasing text written in sand on
a beach does not suffice for the task, since the microscopic evolution of the
entire (sea + beach) system is conventionally assumed to be unitary, i.e.
the information contained in the text is preserved on microscopic level for
all eternity.
4.2. It is well known that the Hawking process of black hole evaporation
is claimed to violate this rule, for the following reason. Let us consider
a pure quantum state corresponding to a distribution of matter of mass
M ≫ MP l (Planck mass), which collapses under its own weight. The den-
sity matrix of such state is given as ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, with vanishing entropy
S = −Tr(ρ ln ρ). If M is high enough, the matter will inevitably form a
black hole. Subsequently, the black hole will slowly evaporate by Hawking
process, emitting blackbody radiation (which by definition carries out no
information). The semiclassical treatment used by Hawking in discovery of
the black hole evaporation and in all subsequent discussions will certainly
break down when the mass of black hole approaches MPl, but what will hap-
pen with the information from the initial state still locked in the black hole?
This is the puzzle of black hole information loss.(20,31) As is well-known, the
possibility Hawking himself proposed is that black hole simply evaporates
completely and the information is irreversibly lost.(32) Although this idea
remains the simplest and the least problematic answer to the puzzle, it
has provoked a lot of controversy, since it implies that the evolution of the
complete system (universe + black hole) is fundamentally non-unitary, and
leads to evolution of pure into mixed quantum states. In contradistinction
to the example above, we can quote the familiar example of the Encyclopae-
dia Britannica thrown into a black hole. Its informational content is lost
forever, if Hawking’s idea about nonunutarity is correct.6
4.3. Thus, the LIU predictions for the solution of the information-
loss puzzle are that either information is actually radiated via the higher-
order effects in the Hawking radiation (solution proposed, among others, by
6Alternatively, it may be lost only from our universe, if the proposal Giddings ascribes
to Freeman Dyson,(31) or the fascinating cosmological ideas of Smolin(33) are correct.
In these views, there are one or more new universes created inside any black hole, to
which the collapsed information is transmitted, without loss of unitarity on the global
(”multiverse”) scale. The multiverse here is not the multiverse of quantum mechanics
(”Everett’s multiverse” = the totality of wavefunction branches), but the multiverse of
quantum cosmology (”Linde’s multiverse” = set of different cosmological domains, pre-
sumably causally and/or topologically disconnected from the domain of ours). Obviously,
these proposals are highly speculative, to say at least.
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t’Hooft(34)), or that stable remnants of the order of Planck mass remain,
encoding an arbitrarily high amount of information.(31) Of course, the in-
formation spoken of in both cases is just the apparent one. The two cases
are different sensu stricto, since the first option (information transmitted to
the universe) necessarily invokes further symmetry breaking and subsequent
creation of an enormous number of ”new” histories, which is not necessarily
so in the second option (sufficiently isolated black hole may leave a rem-
nant without any measurement-like interaction). However, although the
informational content is only apparent, the prediction is physical enough to
be falsified. Apart from support it gives LIU as a scientific hypothesis, it
should be mentioned that both these options (emission of information or
its encoding in remnants; we can classify the possible creation of new uni-
verses as a highly special case of remnant solution) possess their own rather
formidable internal problems.
4.4. The case of remnants as storage space for information becomes
even lesser plausible if some predictions of the currently widely debated M-
theories turn out to be correct. It has been proposed, in order to solve the
infamous hierarchy problem in particle physics, that new extra dimensions
enable significant lowering of the Planck mass scale, as compared to the con-
vention 4-D case.(35,36) It is intuitively clear why lowering of the Planck mass
is detrimental to the remnant proposal for explanation of the information
loss puzzle: smaller the black hole remnants are, the ratio of information
to mass which needs encoding becomes larger, and the entire picture less
plausible. In the extreme versions of M-theory proposal, MP l ∼ 1 TeV,
and the encoding efficiency rises for an astounding factor of ∼ 1016. If these
ideas receive further confirmation, they would make the case for information
conservation even less palatable.
5. WERE YOUR FEELINGS IN THE INITIAL POWER
SPECTRUM?
5.1. The conjecture (D) amounts to the idea that initial density pertur-
bations contained, among other things, every single bit of information in a
painting of Bruegel, sentence of Plato, a song of Beatles or the shape of any
single printed letter in Tegmark’s paper. These things are not, however,
contained in any ”extractable” manner, but are present by virtue of high
symmetry and thus are similar to the contents of books in Borges’ ”The Li-
brary of Babel”, in which all conceivable combinations of letters do contain
the entire fund of human (and any other expressible) knowledge, which is
perfectly useless to any mortal user.(37) However, once a particular set of
apparent information has been selected, its temporal evolution is completely
determined for all times. In the same manner, the evolution of any partic-
ular piece of (apparent) information can be traced back to the spectrum of
initial perturbations, and can be effectively reduced to it.
5.2. It is important to understand that LIU theory goes much further
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than the usual (”moderate”) reductionism in this respect. It is, for instance,
substantially stronger requirement than that embodied in the usual work-
ing philosophy of computationalism,7 since it does not only postulate that
all examples of mental phenomena and their consequences mentioned above
are algorithmically describable, but also that such algorithms have been
pre-existent even to the existence of humankind in the universe! Computa-
tionalism per se does not include any specific concept of time and temporal
becoming. However, with LIU we loose any freedom in imagining various
ways of functioning of human (and other) minds in time. It is unnecessary
to emphasize that any arguments quoted against computationalism in the
literature eo ipso count as arguments against the LIU hypothesis.(21,38)
5.3. Although this cannot as yet be argued against on purely physi-
cal grounds, we may notice that the history of scientific and philosophical
thought gives more than one example of failure of such extremely reduc-
tionist ideas, the example of ether being probably the most investigated and
the best-known one. Other relatively recent cases of failures of reductionist
programmes in cosmology include Eddington’s numerological ”fundamen-
tal theory”, Bondi-Lyttleton electrical universe,(40) as well as the classical
steady state theory of Bondi, Gold and Hoyle.(41) Of course, there have been
cases of successful reductionist theories in the history of physics; however,
in weighting this issue, one should keep in mind that cosmological theories
(such as LIU) in particular should be heavily scrutinized, since it seems that
in cosmology reductionistic approach is on a less stable ground than in the
other physical disciplines. Furthermore, when judging LIU at the present
state of relative ignorance as to the details of cosmological evidence as well as
on the empirical merits of the ”no-collapse” versions of quantum mechanics,
the circumstance that this theory goes much further in reductionism than
the ether theory (or any other theory in the history of science!) has to be
taken into account. It is important to bear in mind that LIU hypothesis is
also antithetical to those versions of the ”no-collapse” theory—such as the
”many minds” theory(42)—which include some non-reductionist elements.
6. NOT SO SIMPLE AFTER ALL?
6.1. We have considered several additional issues stemming from Tegmark’s
LIU theory. The good news for cosmologists interested in application of
information and complexity theory to the observable slice of the quantum
grand superposition is that dynamical laws will still offer a lot of interesting
material to study. If we reject the extreme essentialist position that the goal
of science is revealing the ”deep” and ”true” nature of reality, than the only
quantity of true interest to sciences is the apparent information, which is not
7A doctrine in the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences stating (roughly) that
cognition and consciousness are instances of the execution of sufficiently complex com-
putational algorithms.(39) Of course, the complexity in this context is just a necessary
condition: the search for the right kind of complexity continues.
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going to be exhausted in foreseeable future.8 In that respect, consequences
of LIU for the astrophysical Weltanschaung are not so serious as it might
look at first. The issue of quantity and evolution of apparent informational
content of any particular slice or the close related slices remains a legiti-
mate target of physical discourse. Moreover, the dynamics of entropy in-
crease (that is, the manner of structure formation) remains fully meaningful
and legitimate physical question. The same applies for sciences other than
physical, since they are also, if the LIU theory is correct, just extensions of
our knowledge of non-linear, apparent-information-creating processes. The
same circumstance does go far toward mitigating Tegmark’s dramatic con-
clusion portraying LIU as ”arguing that even the intricate structures that
are the subjects of our thoughts, dreams and efforts in life, everything from
our loved ones to our parking tickets, are perhaps more aptly described as il-
lusions, as manifestations of the fact that our minds experience the grandeur
of reality merely from an extremely limited frog perspective In short, reality
would be much more banal than it appears to be.” While it will certainly
always remain at least partially a matter of personal taste, in the opinion
of the present author, the fact that the (apparent) information content of
each component of the superposition is well-defined warrants the label of
”good news”. The LIU theory, if confirmed, certainly will offer a great leap
forward in our understanding of reality, and if falsified, will reveal a host of
new insights in the process. This is partially recognized by Tegmark, when
he writes: ”If we thus restrict our value judgments to empirical considera-
tions, the picture put forward here would have quite positive implications
for our ability to do science in the future.” However, the restriction to ”em-
pirical considerations” seems unnecessary (at least because if restricted in
such a manner we would have hardly been able to come up with a theory
like LIU!). Perceiving the very deepest symmetry that may exist could as
well invoke positive value judgements as to the achievements of science and
our ability to do it well in the future.
6.2. Of course, a further note to be taken is that the narrowness can
be construed as a virtue of LIU hypothesis. It is well-known that epis-
temological criteria favor theories with well-defined predictions over those
with predictions based on any number of (more or less free) parameters. A
paradigmatic example of this kind in cosmology is to be found in the great
controversy between the classical steady-state theory and the relativistic
(”Big Bang”) world models.(43) It is exactly because of this controversy and
of the challenge posed by the rival steady-state paradigm, that the relativis-
8Admittedly bizarre, we may notice that if we do stick to this extreme view, then the
LIU hypothesis—if not falsified—represents a true ”theory of everything”, since apart
from those few bytes of information on the initial quantum state of the universe, there is
nothing more to be learnt whatsoever. However uninspiring, this prospect may deserve
consideration within the framework of epistemological discussions on the topic of status
and power of possible ”theories of everything” currently under development. It offers
rather novel look at the things: we may be able to reach this ”holy grail” of physics, but
it may possibly be a complete anticlimax—a formally correct, but empirically shallow
theory.
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tic cosmology became a proper science, with well-defined methodological
and epistemic apparatus, and a set of observational criteria for rejection or
acceptance of cosmological conjectures. The challenge was crucial exactly
because the steady-state was such a narrow, well-defined theory with clear-
cut and obviously falsifiable predictions. A similar situation occurs with
the LIU hypothesis: a conceptually simple observational falsification of it
(say through an unambiguous observation of the final Hawking explosion
of black holes together with the proof that extra information can not be
hidden in higher orders of the emitted radiation, or a proof that transition
of pure into mixed states is hidden somewhere else in nature, say in quan-
tum gravity or in functioning of human brains) will enormously benefit our
total cosmological understanding, and may even set a new paradigm on the
informational content of everything that exists.
6.3. We conclude that additional requirements a posteriori diminish
the probability of the low-information universe hypothesis—fascinating as
it is—being the correct description of everything that exists.
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